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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Hasan lcanovic appeals from the district court's order dismissing his petition
seeking post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.

This appeal presents

what appears to be a question of first impression in Idaho. That is - whether a district
court's statement to a non-citizen defendant that there may be potential immigration
consequences for his plea cures any deficiency on the part of trial counsel in failing to
advise a non-citizen client as to the specific potential consequences of that plea, where
those consequences are clear from the law.
The answer to this question is no. Under the standards articulated in Padilla v.

Kentucky, a non-citizen criminal defendant is entitled to specific, affirmative, and correct
legal advice as to the presumptive immigration consequences of a guilty plea where the
immigration consequences of his plea are clear.

Mr. lcanovic, a non-citizen, pleaded

guilty to felony domestic violence, which clearly renders him subject to automatic
deportation both as an aggravated felony as a crime of violence, and as a crime of
domestic violence.

There is no dispute in this case that Mr. lcanovic's trial counsel

failed to advise him of the specific presumptive consequences of his plea. As important,
the district court's general advisory that some form of consequence might arise did not
cure this deficiency - Mr. lcanovic was entitled to know, prior to entering his guilty plea,
what the specific legal ramifications of this plea were under well-settled immigration law.
Because he was never given this specific information, either from the court or
from his trial counsel, and because there is a reasonable probability that Mr. lcanovic

1

would not have pleaded guilty had he been so informed, the district court erred when it
dismissed Mr. lcanovic's petition seeking post-conviction relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Hasan lcanovic filed a timely petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty
plea and sentencing for felony domestic violence.

(R., pp.3-4.)

In this petition,

Mr. lcanovic alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to
his counsel's failure to advise him, prior to pleading guilty, that his plea would result in
adverse immigration consequences that included deportation and loss of the ability to
seek United States citizenship. (R., p.4.) He further alleged that his resulting plea was
not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily as a result of his counsel's deficient
performance. (R., p.4.)
In his affidavit filed in support of this petition, Mr. lcanovic averred that, prior to
the entry of his plea, he had asked his counsel specifically whether this plea would
result in him being deported back to Bosnia and whether the conviction would preclude
him from becoming a United States citizen. (R., pp.7-8.) According to Mr. lcanovic, his
counsel said that neither consequence would result from his guilty plea to felony
domestic violence. (R., pp.7-8.) However, Mr. lcanovic averred that he was served with
an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer once he was placed on
probation and was currently being held on that detainer.

(R., pp.7-8.)

Finally,

Mr. lcanovic averred that he would not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence
had it not been for his counsel's erroneous advice. (R., pp.7-8.)
Thereafter, the district court issued a notice of its intent to summarily dismiss this
petition. (R., pp.15-21.) The court recognized that, accepting Mr. lcanovic's allegations
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as true, his trial counsel tendered constitutionally deficient performance in light of the
recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky1. (R., pp.18-19.) However,
the district court found that Mr. lcanovic had not established the prejudice prong of his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel - i.e. that, but for this erroneous advice, he
would not have pleaded guilty - because the trial court advised him at the time of taking
his plea that the plea might result in adverse immigration consequences. (R., pp.1920.) Therefore, in the district court's view, the deficiency of trial counsel was remedied
by the court. (R., p.20.)
Mr. lcanovic responded to the district court's notice of its intent to dismiss his
post-conviction petition. (R., pp.27-33.) First, Mr. lcanovic noted that the immigration
consequences resulting from his plea to felony domestic battery were clear - it is an
aggravated felony, as well as a crime of domestic violence, that constitutes a deportable
offense. (R., pp.29-31.) As such, under Padilla, his counsel had a duty not just to warn
that there could be some form of adverse immigration consequences flowing from this
plea, rather, his counsel had a duty to inform Mr. lcanovic what those specific
consequences were. (R., pp.31-32.) ln light of the duty to inform Mr. lcanovic regarding
the specific immigration consequences of his plea, Mr. lcanovic argued that the district
court's advisory that there may be some form of adverse consequence did not cure
counsel's deficiency. (R., p.32.)
A hearing was held on Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief.

His

former trial counsel, Jared Martens, testified at this hearing. (Tr., p.7, L.8 - p.23, L.5.)
Mr. Martens testified that he was aware that Mr. lcanovic was Bosnian at the time of his

1

Padilla v. Kentucky,_ U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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representation. (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15.) He was also provided documentation during the
discovery process, prior to Mr. lcanovic's guilty plea, that indicated that Mr. lcanovic
was not a United States citizen. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12, L.6.) Although Mr. Martens did
not recall whether he paid attention to this fact during the course of representing
Mr. lcanovic, he did acknowledge receiving and reviewing this documentation.
(Tr., p.11, L.24-p.12, L.8.)
Mr. Martens further acknowledged that Mr. lcanovic was concerned about the
potential immigration consequences that could arise from his criminal charges - so
much so that they had talked about the matter more than once in discussing his criminal
case.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.9-14, p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.5.)

Specifically, Mr. lcanovic was

concerned that a guilty plea would result in the institution of removal proceedings
against him. (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Martens merely told Mr. lcanovic that he didn't
know whether that would happen. (Tr., p.12, L.25-p.13, L.17.) However, Mr. Martens
denied telling Mr. lcanovic that he specifically would not be deported based upon his
plea to felony domestic battery. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-19.)
Mr. Martens also admitted that he couldn't recall specifically whether he told
Mr. lcanovic that he would still be able to apply for U.S. citizenship even after his guilty
plea, although he believed that he did not make that representation. (Tr., p.14, L.23 p.15, L.10.)

In any case, Mr. Martens stated that he would have likely just referred

Mr. lcanovic to an immigration attorney to answer that question, since he was not
familiar with immigration law. (Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15 L 10.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Martens expressed his belief that the odds of a noncitizen defendant facing deportation or removal proceedings based upon a guilty plea to
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felony domestic violence were not likely, but that it was, "probably a fifty-fifty shot," that
this would occur. (Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.2.) Mr. Martens did believe that, at the time
of the evidentiary hearing, such a result would be "highly probable." {Tr., p.21, L.17 p.22, L.1.) He did not share his personal assessment of the likelihood of this outcome
with Mr. \canovic as part of his representation during the underlying criminal
proceedings; instead, Mr. Martens testified that he probably told Mr. lcanovic that he
didn't know what the immigration consequences would be.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.3-13.)

Mr. Martens was also unfamiliar with the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla at the
time of his testimony. (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-16.)
During closing arguments, Mr. lcanovic pointed out to the district court that
where, as in Mr. lcanovic's case, the immigration consequences for a guilty plea are
clear, it is not sufficient for counsel to merely tell a client that he or she does not know
what the immigration consequences will be. (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-10.) Rather, counsel must
specifically inform a non-citizen client what the consequences are and consult with the
client with these consequences in mind during any plea negotiations. (Tr., p.25, L.14.)
Mr. lcanovic noted that, even if the district court found Mr. Martens more credible on the
issue of whether affirmative misadvice as to immigration consequences was given, this
did not matter for Padilla purposes, as affirmative and correct advice was required.
(Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.16.) Mr. lcanovic also disputed that the plea colloquy from the
court cured this error, as the court merely informed Mr. lcanovic that he might face
adverse immigration consequences from his plea - not that he would face adverse
immigration consequences - nor did the court inform Mr. lcanovic what those adverse
consequences would be. (Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.27, L.15.)
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The district court ruled from the bench following closing arguments from the
parties. First, the court found it "difficult" to believe that Mr. lcanovic was unaware of the
immigration consequences of his plea when a judgment that was entered following his
plea contained an advisory that he faced an immigration hold. (Tr., p.31, L.14 - p.32,
L.10.) The court also noted that, at the time of the taking of his guilty plea, the district
court informed Mr. lcanovic that his plea might result in adverse immigration
consequences. (Tr., p.33, Ls.19-25.)
Turning to the standards articulated in Padilla, the district court first found that
Mr. Martens did not affirmatively tell Mr. lcanovic that there would be no adverse
immigration consequences for his plea - i.e. that counsel did not provide misadvice to
Mr. lcanovic.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.16-18.)

Regarding the failure of Mr. Martens to provide

specific, accurate advice as to the immigration consequences of his plea, the district
court held that this failure was "cured" by the district court's advisory to Mr. lcanovic
during the change of plea hearing that there might be adverse immigration
consequences for his plea. (Tr., p.35, L.19 - p.37, L.21.) Thereafter, the district court
dismissed Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction petition.
Following the hearing on Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction petition, the district court
entered its order dismissing his petition based on the reasons set forth at that hearing.
(R., p.48.)

Mr. lcanovic timely appeals from the district court's order dismissing his

petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.44.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction
relief?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. lcanovic's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it dismissed Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-

conviction relief because Mr. lcanovic demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of his guilty
plea to felony domestic violence. There is no dispute that Mr. lcanovic, a non-citizen,
was not informed by his trial counsel prior to entering his plea that his plea would render
him automatically and presumptively deportable under clear immigration law. Because
the immigration consequences of his plea were clear under federal law, Mr. lcanovic
was entitled to affirmative and correct advice as to the immigration consequences of this
plea.
The district court's general advisory that Mr. lcanovic might be subject to adverse
immigration consequences did not cure either the deficiency or any prejudice flowing
from counsel's failure to give accurate, affirmative advice. Mr. lcanovic was entitled to
know, prior to the entry of his plea, what the specific immigration consequences of his
plea would be. Under the standards articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla, a
general statement that unidentified immigration consequences might occur is not
sufficient. Additionally, Mr. Padilla demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would
not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence had he been informed prior to his
plea of the presumptive immigration consequences that would follow.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A petition seeking post-conviction relief initiates a separate civil proceeding

distinct from the original criminal actions. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,
233 (Ct. App. 1994). "In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the applicant to
establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 700 (1999); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing
mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual
findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the
relevant law to those facts. Id., citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App.1988).
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002).
A petitioner's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel within a post-conviction
petition is measured by the standards articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Strickland v. Washington 2 . See, e.g., State v. Yokovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007).
The standard involves a two-party inquiry:

first, whether the defendant has

demonstrated that his counsel tendered deficient performance, meaning that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Id.

2

In the context of alleged deficiencies of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9

counsel relating to guilty pleas, the specific standard for prejudice is whether, "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2009).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. lcanovic's Petition For PostConviction Relief

1.

Under Padilla v. Kentuckv. Defense Counsel Owes A Duty Pursuant To
The Sixth Amendment Of The United States Constitution To A Non-Citizen
Defendant To Inform His Or Her Client Regarding Potential Deportation
Consequences Of A Guilty Plea

Prior to the recent U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, there was
a dearth of case law in Idaho dealing with what obligations, if any, defense counsel had
towards a non-citizen client with regard to immigration consequences flowing from a
guilty plea to a criminal offense. The leading case was Retamoza v. State, in which the
Idaho Court of Appeals determined that there was no deficient performance where
defense counsel failed to advise a non-citizen criminal defendant of the then-existing
option of a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD). Retamoza

v.

State,

125 Idaho 792, 795-797 (Ct App. 1994). The Retamoza Court so held based explicitly
on parsing out the distinction between direct and collateral consequences of a guilty
plea, and the concomitant conclusion that immigration consequences were collateral to
such a plea. Id.
The Retamoza Court's conclusion is somewhat understandable given the state of
the immigration law at the time of the defendant's plea in that case. At the time of the
guilty plea of the defendant in Retamoza in 1988, there existed two very important
mechanisms through which adverse immigration consequences flowing from a criminal
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conviction could be avoided. See Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 793. First, a non-citizen who
was eligible for deportation because of a criminal conviction could seek a judicial
recommendation against deportation, or JRAD. See Padilla v. Kentucky,_ U.S._,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (2010).

Under this provision, the sentencing judge for either a

state or federal prosecution had the power to enter a recommendation against
deportation, and this recommendation had the effect of precluding the executive branch
from seeking deportation. Id. Therefore, at the time of the Retamoza opinion, there
was no such thing as an "automatically deportable offense."
There was an additional second layer of process through which a non-citizen
criminal

defendant

could

avoid

adverse

immigration

consequences,

such

as

deportation, as a result of his or her plea at the time Retamoza was decided. Prior to
1996, the Attorney General retained discretion to grant relief from deportation. Padilla,
130 S. Ct. at 1480. As such, the Retamoza opinion dealt with an attorney's advisories
about immigration consequences to a guilty plea at a time when these consequences
were truly avoidable in virtually all cases.
But the landscape of immigration law changed drastically in the intervening
years, and these changes motivated the Padilla Court to make clear what a criminal
defense attorneys obligations are with regard to advising non-citizen clients as to
immigration consequences of a plea.

Since the time of the guilty plea at issue in

Retamoza, the authority of a trial court to grant a JRAD has been eliminated entirely; as

has the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief against deportation.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479-1480. As noted by the Padilla Court:

The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over
the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable
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offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent
deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of
deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the
harsh consequence of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.
Id. at 1478 (internal citations omitted). The Court continued:

These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes
of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.
These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law,
deportation is an integral part - indeed, sometimes the most important
part - of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes.
Id. at 1480.

In light of the modern interconnectedness of criminal guilty pleas and
presumptively mandatory adverse immigration consequences, the Padilla Court
developed a two-tiered test for what advisories are required under the Sixth Amendment
with regard to the potential immigration consequences of a plea. Where the immigration
consequences of a particular plea are "unclear or uncertain," trial counsel has a duty to
inform a non-citizen defendant that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
adverse immigration consequences.

Id.

at 1483.

But when the deportation

consequences of a particular plea are clear, trial counsel has a duty to give his or her
non-citizen client affirmative and correct advice regarding the specific immigration
consequences of that plea. Id.
The Padilla Court, in formulating this test, explicitly rejected the idea that the
measure of counsel's responsibility in informing clients regarding the consequence of a
guilty plea is measured by whether the consequence would be classified as direct or
collateral. The Court noted that it has, "never applied a distinction between direct and
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collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional
assistance' under Strickland."

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.

And the Court further

asserted that such a distinction is particularly inapplicable in the context of immigration
consequences for criminal convictions. Id. at 1481-1482.

2.

Trial Counsel Tendered Deficient Performance When Trial Counsel Failed
To Advise Mr. lcanovic As To The Specific Potential Immigration
Consequences Of His Plea To Felony Domestic Battery

a.

The Deportation Consequences For Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To
Felony Domestic Battery Were Clear Under The Federal Law

Preliminarily, the district court in this case never made a finding as to whether the
immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's guilty plea were clear under the pertinent
federal statutes.

(See Tr., generally, R., pp.17-21, 48.)

Mr. lcanovic submits that,

where the pertinent legal standards attendant on trial counsel's performance are
dependent upon a determination of whether the immigration consequences for a gullty
plea are clear, such a determination is necessary to the district court's disposition of a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the failure to do so constitutes error.
Additionally, there appears to have been some confusion on the part of the State
as to what the Padilla Court meant when it discussed those cases where the potential
immigration consequences of a plea were clear under the federal law.

The State

repeatedly referenced, and argued, the issue of whether and when Mr. lcanovic would
eventually be actually, physically removed as though this were the standard by which
counsel's duty was measured. (Tr., p.13, L.5 - p.15, L.10, p.22, L.9 - p.23, L.2, p.28,
L. 13 - p.29, L.20.)

The State's misunderstanding of the actual standard for when
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definitive advice as to the potential immigration consequences of a plea is required can
be encapsulated in the following statement:
And I think that's because immigration law is not clear. It is not a black
and white matter where you know for sure that if someone is going to be
convicted of a crime like this that they are going to be deported. Rather,
they are going to be subject to it and they may or may not be
deported which is the category that Mr. lcanovic falls into.
(Tr., p.29, Ls. 13-20) (emphasis added.)
To be clear, this is not the standard by which counsel's duty to give concrete,
accurate, affirmative advice as to the specific immigration consequences is judged. The
test is whether the federal statutory law makes it clear that the particular offense will
render a non-citizen client eligible for deportation or subject to automatic

deportation - not whether, in the best guess of defense counsel, immigration and
customs enforcement will ever get around to initiating removal proceedings.

See

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1483. And this standard is measured by whether, under the
pertinent immigration statutes, regulations, and case law, the consequence of the
defendant's guilty plea on his or her immigration status is clearly defined. Id. at 1483
(finding that, 'The consequences of Padilla's plea could be easily determined from

reading the removal statute).
Under the applicable immigration statutes and regulations, the immigration
consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were entirely clear. His plea to felony domestic
battery rendered him subject to automatic deportation in light of two provisions - both as
an aggravated felony, as this was a "crime of violence" under federal law, and as a
crime of domestic violence.
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i.

Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In
This Case Constituted An Admission To An Aggravated
Felony Under Immigration Law Because His Offense
Qualified As A Crime Of Violence

Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence under I.C. §§ 18-903, 18918 (2).

The Amended Information as to this charged alleged that the crime was

committed as follows:
That the Defendant, HASAN ICANOVIC, on or about the 11 th day of May,
2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully use
force and/or violence upon the person of Sanela Mehmedovic by pushing
Sanela Mehmedovic to the ground and by committing said battery, did
inflict a traumatic injury to the person of Sanela Mehmedovic, to-wit: a
bruised lip, and where Sanela Mehmedovic and the Defendant are
household members.
(R., p.29.)
In Idaho, the offense of felony domestic violence, as charged in this case, is
defined as a battery against a household member that inflicts traumatic injury.

See

I.C. § 18-918(2). Under the manner in which Mr. lcanovic was charged in this case, he
was alleged to have committed this battery through, "willfully and unlawfully [using] force
or violence."

See I.C. § 18-903(1); R., p.29.

By the terms of this plea agreement,

Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to an offense that constitutes an aggravated felony, as a
crime of violence, under the pertinent immigration statutes.
A non-citizen who commits an aggravated felony is presumptively deportable.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An offense constitutes an aggravated felony if, inter

alia, the offense constitutes "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but
not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least
one year." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). ln turn, a "crime of violence," for purposes of
immigration law, is defined as follows:
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The term "crime of violence" means(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or

(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (emphasis added).
One of the elements of felony domestic violence, as charged in the State's
Amended Information in this case, was that Mr. lcanovic willfully and unlawful used
force or violence on the person of another. Given this, Mr. lcanovic's plea of guilty to
felony domestic violence in this case meets with the definition of a crime of violence,
and therefore constitutes an aggravated felony that rendered him eligible for
deportation.
The immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea of guilty to felony domestic
violence were clear under federal law - this offense falls squarely within the statutory
definition of an aggravated felony as a crime of violence for which there is a
presumption of deportability.

ii.

Mr. lcanovic's Guilty Plea To Felony Domestic Violence In
This Case Constituted An Admission To A Crime Of
Domestic Violence

In addition, the immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were clear, as
he was eligible for deportation under the plea as an admission to a crime of domestic
violence. Under federal law, a non-citizen is eligible for deportation if he or she commits
a crime of domestic violence.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
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A "crime of domestic

violence" for immigration purposes means a crime of violence that is directed against a
person who shares one certain enumerated relationships with the defendant, or who is
otherwise "protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or family violence
laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local
government." Id.
Mr. lcanovic pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence, which inherently involves
the allegation of a crime of violence against a "household member." See I.C. §§ 18903, 18-918. This offense establishes certain classes of persons who are protected
from the charged individual's acts under the domestic violence statute.

Therefore,

Mr. lcanovic's plea to this offense falls clearly within the scope of a crime of domestic
violence under federal immigration law. By statute, the consequence of his conviction
was clear - as a crime of domestic violence under immigration law, it rendered him
eligible for deportation.

b.

Because The Immigration Consequences For Mr. lcanovic's Plea
Were Clear Under The Federal Law, His Trial Counsel Had A Duty
To Advise Mr. lcanovic Of The Specific Consequences Of This
Plea, And It Constituted Deficient Performance When Counsel
Failed To Do So

Where the immigration consequences of a guilty plea are clear under federal law,
trial counsel has a duty to affirmatively inform a non-citizen defendant as to the specific
immigration consequences of that plea.

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. As has been

noted, the immigration consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea were clear - his plea
rendered him eligible for deportation - and further subject to a conclusive presumption
of deportability.
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There is no dispute in this case that Mr. lcanovic's trial attorney did not advise
him of this fact, despite multiple conversations during which Mr. lcanovic asked his
attorney about the immigration consequences of his plea.

(Tr., p.14, L.12 - p.16, L.5,

p.20, Ls.11-13, p.21, L.8 - p.22, L.1.) Because Mr. lcanovic was entitled to be informed
by counsel of the specific immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony
domestic violence, and because there is no dispute in this case that his counsel did not
provide this information, Mr. lcanovic's trial counsel tendered deficient performance.

3.

The District Court's Advisory During The Plea Colloquy Did Not Cure Any
Prejudice Flowing From Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance

The district court in this case, while not expressly finding deficient performance of
Mr. lcanovic's trial counsel, dismissed his post-conviction petition based upon the
finding that the court's advisory during the change-of-plea hearing cured counsel's
deficiency and/or any possible prejudice. (Tr., p.32, L.11 - p.37, L.21.) At the change
of plea hearing, the following exchange took place between the court and Mr. lcanovic:
Q:

Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States
that your plea of guilty to a felony or even a misdemeanor may
result in deportation, the inability to obtain legal status, or denial of
an application for United States citizenship?

A:

Yes.

Plea Tr., p.7, Ls.18-24 (emphasis added).
But the Padilla Court made clear that a vague advisory that a guilty plea might
have immigration consequences is only sufficient where such consequences of a plea
"are unclear or uncertain" under federal law. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Such a nonspecific advisory is not sufficient, however, where the immigration consequences of a
plea are clear - as they are with regard to Mr. lcanovic's plea in this case. Given this,

18

the district court's advisory, which did not convey what the specific immigration
consequences of Mr. lcanovic's plea would be, did not cure trial counsel's deficient
performance nor any resulting prejudice in this case.
The district court's ruling also ignores another fundamental purpose of trial
counsel being adequately informed, and also informing her client, about the potential
immigration consequences of a particular plea. As a practical matter, this information
would allow defense counsel to attempt to negotiate a plea for an offense that may have
lesser sanction with regard to immigration consequences - either to seek to avoid
automatic deportation or to seek to avoid a charge for which any future re-entry to the
United States would be categorically barred. In discussing prior decisions outlining the
expectations of counsel regarding immigration consequences, the Padilla Court noted:
We too have previously recognized that "'[p]reserving the client's right to
remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any
potential jail sentence."' Likewise, we have recognized that "preserving the
possibility of' discretionary relief from deportation under § 212(c) of the
1952 INA "would have been one of the principle benefits sought by
defendants in deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to
proceed to trial." We expected that counsel who were unaware of the
discretionary relief measures would "follo[w] the advice of numerous
practical guides" to advise themselves of the importance of this form of
discretionary relief.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.

The Padilla Court re-affirmed the importance of trial counsel's awareness of
immigration consequences in the plea negotiation process later in the Opinion, noting
that a single criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple potential charges. Id.
at 1486. Because of the immense significance that adverse immigration consequences
may have for a non-citizen defendant, counsel's awareness of these consequences and
communication of them to her client serves to facilitate the plea negotiating process by
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enabling counsel to "plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a
conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation." Id.
Thus, it is not only a client's awareness of the immigration consequences of a
plea that are at stake in ensuring that a non-citizen defendant is advised of these
consequences, it is the ability of counsel to effectively negotiate a plea on that client's
behalf, and with the full goals of that representation in mind. These goals will frequently
include avoidance of adverse immigration consequences. This is not a function that can
be fulfilled by a district court.
Mr.

lcanovic was entitled to be

informed of the

consequences that would clearly flow from his guilty plea.

specific immigration

The district court's non-

specific advisory that he may face adverse immigration consequences did not cure any
error flowing from the deficient performance of Mr. lcanovic's trial counsel.

4.

Mr. lcanovic Was Preiudiced As A Result Of Trial Counsel's Deficient
Performance

Mr. lcanovic also demonstrated prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to advise
him regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to felony domestic
violence. As has been noted, the test for prejudice in such a case is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, had the defendant received adequate advice, he would not
have pleaded guilty to the charged offense. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676.
The potential immigration consequences for a guilty plea cannot be overstated.
In fact, the Padilla Court noted the severity of deportation as an immigration
consequence in noting that it is the modern equivalent of banishment or exile. Padilla,
130 S. Ct. at 1486. Under the modern landscape of immigration law, the Padilla Court
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further noted that deportation is often the most important aspect of the penalties that
may be imposed on non-citizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Id. at
1480.

It is undisputed that Mr. lcanovic was very concerned about the potential
immigration consequences of his plea prior to pleading guilty. He averred within his
petition for post-conviction relief that, but for counsel's inadequate advice regarding the
immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to felony
domestic violence. (R., p.8.) It is also undisputed that Mr. lcanovic repeatedly asked
his trial attorney for counsel and advice as to the immigration consequences of his plea.
(Tr., p.14, 1.12 - p.16, L.5.) Under the record in this case, it is clear that the immigration
consequences of his plea were of central importance to Mr. lcanovic in weighing
whether to plead guilty in this case.

In light of this, Mr. lcanovic demonstrated a

reasonable probability that, but for the absence of affirmative, correct advice as to the
consequences of his guilty plea, he would not have pleaded guilty to felony domestic
violence.

CONCLUSION

Mr. lcanovic respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 23 rd day of August, 2011.
SARAH E. TOMPKI
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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